Industrial Specialisation and Productivity Catch-Up in CEECs - Patterns and Prospects - by Johannes Stephan
 
 
Industrial Specialisation and Productivity 
Catch-Up in CEECs 
- Patterns and Prospects - 
Dr Johannes Stephan 
 
 
 September 2002 Nr. 166 
Institut für    Halle Institute for Economic Research 
Wirtschaftsforschung Halle 































Author:  Dr Johannes Stephan 
  Mittel- und Osteuropa  
  Tel.: (0345) 7753-835 (-831 Secr.) 
  Email: jsn@iwh-halle.de 





Diskussionspapiere stehen in der alleinigen Verantwortung des jeweiligen Autors. Die 
darin vertretenen Auffassungen stellen keine Meinungsäußerung des IWH dar. 
The responsibility for discussion papers lies solely with the individual authors. The 
views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the IWH. 
 
 
Anregungen und kritische Bemerkungen zu den dargestellten Untersuchungsergebnissen 
sind jederzeit willkommen und erwünscht. 






INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG HALLE (IWH) 
Postanschrift:  Postfach 11 03 61, 06017 Halle (Saale) 
Hausanschrift:  Kleine Märkerstraße 8, 06108 Halle (Saale) 
Telefon:  (03 45) 77 53-60 
Telefax:  (03 45) 77 53-820 








This paper establishes an empirical model of CEEC’s industrial labour productivity 
growth determined by patterns of specialisation in manufacturing industries and the extent 
of backwardness. This model is then applied to predict potentials of productivity growth 
and prospects of productivity catch-up in two distinct scenarios of structural adjustment 
in EU accession states. 
The predictions suggest that productivity catch-up will at the very least take more than 
two decades with Slovenia and the Slovak Republic arriving first. The Czech Republic 
and Hungary share similar catch-up prospects slightly more favourable as compared to 
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Introduction - Motivation of analysis 
 
More than a decade since systemic change, the most advanced EU accession economies 
in Central East Europe (CEECs) are today well integrated into the World market in 
general and the European one in particular. Between industrial producers in East and 
West, significant production networks have evolved, not least in the form of foreign 
direct investments. A largely liberalised foreign trade between EU accession candidates 
and member countries as well as the geographical proximity between western and 
eastern producers and customers suggest vivid technology transfer from West to East. 
The high level of industrial experience in the East inherited from their industrialised past 
allows technology transferred from the West to be readily implemented in production in 
the East. 
Since EU accession countries have overcome their transformational recession, labour 
productivity growth in CEEC’s industrial sectors has impressively outpaced growth in the 
West. Non-the-less, large gaps between labour productivities in the two integrating 
regions still persist and the question arises as to what the individual country’s prospects 
for productivity catch-up are, judged from the conditions prevailing today. 
To provide an account of catching up potentials and prospects in accession candidates, 
the analysis focuses on the respective patterns of specialisation in the manufacturing 
industries of the countries assessed. The assumption is that industrial structures having 
emerged in the course of the process of real economy integration can explain the 
previous records of productivity growth and that future structural patterns can likewise 
determine the accession country’s prospects of productivity catch-up: patterns determine 
prospects. 
In empirical research on transition economies, this is a largely underdeveloped field 
despite its clear relevance, especially for the assessment of future EU structural and 
cohesion policy in newly admitted members. 
 
Data and methods 
Empirical analysis of industrial structures is very sensitive to the data used and the 
methods applied. In order to allow comparability of results across the countries 
assessed, most data is taken from the EUROSTAT databases: here, s tatistics are 
harmonised and allow a high level of comparability across countries. The downturn of 
this source is that available data is not very up-to-date: the analysis can only draw upon  
statistics up to the year of 1998 for 3-digit data and 1999 for 2-digit data. Some of the 
missing data was complemented by OECD and official national statistics. Levels of 
industrial labour productivities are calculated as the ratio between the sum of value 
added in the industrial branches of manufacturing per number of people working in these 
branches. Labour productivities are not corrected for the intensity of use of factors (as IWH ______________________________________________________________ 
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e.g. hours worked by employment), as comparable estimates for this do not exist - 
comparability of results across the countries analysed is deemed more important in this 
analysis. 
The level of disaggregation in empirical studies depends on the availability of data
1
: our 
analysis uses 2 digit NACE data for value added and employment to calculate branch 
productivities, and 3 digit NACE data of employment shares or, where such is not 
available, value added shares for the classification of branches into the taxonomy for 
specialisation.
2
 In the cases of Poland and Estonia, classification into the taxonomies was 
carefully done with 2-digit employment figures, as here a lower level of disaggregation 
was not available. Of course, the price to pay was that some overlapping of branches 
belonging to more than one class had to be dealt with in a case-by-case manner. 
Exchange rates are corrected by purchasing power estimates, as we expect the 
currencies of CEECs to be in general rather undervalued vis-à-vis the EU  - living 




Outline of the paper 
The paper is organised as follows: after providing a brief overview of manufacturing 
labour productivity levels and growth in the EU accession states of Estonia, Poland, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia, and the average for the 15 current 
EU member states, an empirical model of productivity growth determined by patterns of 
manufacturing specialisation and the degree of backwardness is estimated. The model is 
developed and discussed in part 2. The final part of this paper uses this model to 
estimate future potentials for productivity growth and catch-up prospects for each of the 
EU accession countries in our panel. This is done in two scenarios of future structural 
change, one assuming the emergence of a distinct pattern of specialisation and the other 
assuming structural convergence. The paper closes with a brief summary of main results 
pertaining to the expected speed of productivity growth and catch-up in the countries 
assessed. 
                                                 
1  This not only applies to CEECs. The EUROSTAT Cronos database on western European 
countries is in some cases just as incomplete. Not only is national production-related or 
employment data often not yet harmonised. Data at a level of disaggregation of below the 2 
digit NACE level is often perceived as being too imprecise by national statistical offices to 
warrant their publication. 
2  Of course, shares calculated by employment figures will yield somewhat different results than 
shares calculated by value added figures. This is due to the fact that levels of productivity 
differ between classes of manufacturing branches. 
3  This correction is to allow international comparison and is not motivated by the expectation of 
long-term convergence of prices and exchange rates (as in the purchasing power parity concept 
of some exchange rate theories). ______________________________________________________________ IWH 
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1  Stylised facts: gaps in industrial labour productivity and 
productivity growth in CEECs 
Some 10 years after the countries in Central East Europe switched to a competitive 
system and integrated into the European economic region, and despite impressive growth 
since, large differences in labour productivities between their industries and the ones in 
western Europe still exist. As a member of the group of most advanced transition 
countries, Estonia’s industry exhibits with 14,400  € a level of industrial labour 
productivity as low as some 29 per cent of the respective average EU-15 level of 
49,500 € (see Table 1). Amongst the countries in the panel of this analysis, Estonia has 
the least developed industrial sector. 
Having started systemic transformation a couple of years later than the other countries 
assessed here, Estonia was clearly outpaced in industrial productivity growth by all other 
countries in  our panel (Table 2). Poland is the country with the lowest share of 
employment in manufacturing industry amongst the countries in our panel. In 1999, 
Poland’s industrial productivity reached some 20,200  € per employment, which 
compares to 41 per cent of the average EU-15 level. Industrial productivity growth 
accelerated in particular during the last few years, parallel to the unprecedented increase 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) into Polish industry as well as intensifying industrial 
restructuring, indicated by a decline (in absolute and relative terms) in industrial 
employment from 1998 onwards. 
Hungary’s de-industrialisation started much earlier in the process of transition and 
integration; the country experienced a turn-around already in 1996.
4
 Here, however, 
productivity growth abated somewhat in the last few years in line with recovering 
industrial employment. This is also paralleled by a steady decline in net FDI inflows from 
1996 onwards, i.e. in the aftermath of Hungary’s stabilisation programme of 1995 and 
growing repatriation of profits from FDI.
5
 In 1999, the Hungarian productivity level 
reached some € 23,300, slightly more than 47 per cent of the average EU-level. 
The Czech Republic started in 1993 from about the same level as Hungary. By 1999, 
however, the Czech productivity level only reached some  € 22,000. This weak 
performance could be held to be a result of the mass voucher-privatisation method which 
delayed technological modernisation and organisational restructuring. It can furthermore 
be attributed to the country’s financial crisis in 1997: in it`s aftermath, industrial labour 
productivity levels fell significantly. 
                                                 
4  Incidentally, Hungary is the only country in the sample to have experienced industrial 
employment growth in absolute numbers since transformational recession. 
5  Recently falling net FDI inflows into Hungary can mainly be attributed to the end of the 
privatisation process. IWH ______________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1  Levels of industrial labour productivity in selected countries 
    in PPP €    in % of EU-15 
    1993    1999    1993    1999 
Estonia      7 500      14 400      16.5      29.1 
Poland      13 300      20 200      29.3      40.8 
Czech Republic      15 800      22 000      34.8      44.4 
Slovak Republic      11 700      21 700      25.8      43.8 
Hungary      15 800      23 300      34.8      47.1 
Slovenia      17 100      28 000      37.7      56.6 
EU-15      45 400      49 500      100.0      100.0 
Sources:  EUROSTAT, OECD, WIIW, National Statistical Offices, own calculations. 
In the case of the Slovak Republic, industrial productivity kept growing year by year: 
during the early years of transition, productivity grew by an astonishing 15 per cent per 
year on average. Growth, however, deteriorated later on as a result of the financial crisis 
in the neighbouring Czech Republic. 
Slovenia’s economy has a comparatively large industrial sector and outclasses the other 
countries with the highest industrial productivity level in 1999 at some 28,000 €. Still, this 
only compares to some 57 per cent of the EU-15 level. Slovenia also sticks out as the 
only country in the sample not to experience the typical hype of productivity growth rates 
during the early years following transformational recession.
6
 Rather, its industrial 
productivity growth rates kept on increasing over time. 
Table 2  Growth of industrial labour productivity in selected countries 
    in average GDP-deflated growth rates per anno, in % 
    1996/1993    1999/1996    1999/1993 
Estonia      -3.7      12.7      3.8 
Poland      4.0      6.0      5.3 
Czech Republic      9.2      0.7      5.0 
Slovak Republic      15.4      3.8      10.5 
Hungary      6.4      2.9      5.0 
Slovenia      6.6      6.8      7.4 
EU-15      2.5      1.4      1.9 
Sources:  EUROSTAT, OECD, WIIW, National Statistical Offices, own calculations. 
                                                 
6  Which, in the other countries assessed here, can be attributed mainly to labour shedding as a 
means to increase cost-competitiveness on the new markets. ______________________________________________________________ IWH 
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In general, CEEC’s industries today still exhibit sizeable gaps in industrial labour 
productivities, achieving no more than 30-60 per cent of the average EU-15 level. 
Productivity growth in CEECs by far outpaced that of the average EU-15, but even 
those above-average rates would be associated with e.g. at least one decade before 
Slovenian productivity caught up to the average EU-15 level. If past rates are used as a 
yardstick, the time-span needed for catching up in the case of Poland would amount to 
even three times that of Slovenia. 
What are the sources of productivity gaps and their development? Clearly, history will 
play a significant role: in technological terms, the socialist countries had been 
disconnected from developments in the West. Today, technology employed in 
production substantially differs from production in western Europe. This prominently 
concerns embodied technology in the capital stocks of CEECs. Moreover, criteria for 
the allocation of labour had been different during the socialist era, and some of this can 
be expected to prevail even today. Transformational recession was dominated by 
downward adjustment of industrial employment, but even today, we can assume that this 
adjustment process is not complete. The historical bias of vertical integration of domestic 
industrial production only slowly changes to allow heightened specialisation, 
diversification, division of labour and increased networking and outsourcing activities. 
Despite some ten years since the outset of systemic change and the fundamental changes 
associated with transition and integration, the above outlined sources of productivity gaps 
tend to exhibit some hysteresis: capital replacement takes time, as profitability usually is a 
precondition for investment; people and institutions tend to resist changes in habits and 
beliefs. Alas, changes to these determinants will increase efficiency in the use of scarce 
resources, and will speed up productivity growth and catch-up. 
In contrast, this is not necessarily the case with changes to the structural composition of 
manufacturing industry in the course of adjustment to integration and increased intensity 
of competition. Structural changes can have either effect on productivity growth: they will 
affect average industrial productivity adversely, if the share of branches with typically 
lower levels of productivity increases and vice versa. It is the composition and the shifts 
in shares of particular classes of manufacturing branches as country-specific determinants 
which are being assessed in terms of their influence on productivity growth in this 
analysis. 
2  The empirical model of productivity growth determined by 
specialisation-patterns and the extent of backwardness 
Research on specialisation-matters typically focuses on a theoretical explanation of 
emerging specialisation-patterns by use of models of the tradition of Heckscher-Ohlin or 
Ricardo. Some more recent literature attempts to use New Trade and New Growth 
Theories (see e.g. the large body of literature by Grossman-Helpman, Krugman, Puga IWH ______________________________________________________________ 
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and Venables), but usually falls short of expectations in terms of an empirical application 
of these concepts. With the demise of structuralism as a theoretical concept of 
development economics (see body of literature by Prebish), very little theoretical 
research proceeds from there to interpret specialisation-patterns in terms of conditions 
for economic catch-up. This research matter is largely non-existent in empirical 
applications. At most, empirical research examines whether industrial structures are 




The m ain deficiency with this weak theoretical conceptualisation lies in the fact that it 
remains unclear, whether ‘disadvantageous structures’ are in fact general weaknesses 
which could hamper catching up. First, specialisation-patterns are broadly the result of a 
market-driven process in which the factors had been allocated according to the criterion 
of highest efficiency and therefore would represent the highest achievable level of 
structural competitiveness. These are determined by conditions prevailing in t he 
respective economic regions. Second, development theories typically foresee market-
mechanisms of convergence, be they rooted in the adjustment of relative prices (e.g. the 
factor price equalisation theorem)
8
 or in structural adjustment caused by differing demand 
elasticities with growing income.
9
 There remain, however, several question marks with 
such scenarios: mainly, it is unclear, whether economic catch-up will in effect take place, 
or more pragmatically, will take place in a sufficiently short period of time. Also, thinking 
in terms of specialisation between countries, it is perceivable that increased demand for 
products at the higher end of the above specified spectrum is satisfied by way of imports 
- the given specialisation then exhibits hysteresis and structural current account deficits 
emerge, possibly leading into a development trap.
10
 
Some theoretical models, predominantly based on endogenous growth theories and 
economic geography concepts, perceive the possibility of catching up not taking place in 
particular conditions due to externalities, non-perfect competition, path dependence, and 
hysteresis ( e.g. ‘North-South’, ‘core-periphery’ models, Krugman’s and Posner’s 
‘technology gap’ and ‘imitation gap’ models, ‘product life cycle theories’, ‘quality 
ladder’ concepts, Snower’s ‘low-skill, bad-job trap’ model, see Wolfmayr-Schnitzer 
                                                 
7  See  e.g. Peneder (2000), p. 21, and Zeman (2002). A more demanding approach is used by 
Mickiewicz and Zalewska (2002) on a sectoral level. Here, a particular theory from the de-
industrialisation debate is applied on the cases of transition economies. 
8  For a critical assessment of the Heckscher-Ohlin concept on the particular case of East 
Germany, see Brakman / Garretsen (1994). 
9  With disposable incomes and entrepreneurial profits growing (or as mark-up in combination 
with Verdoon’s law in a Kaldorian model, see  e.g. Fiorillo, 2001), structural patterns are 
predicted to change to reduce perceived structural weaknesses: relative demand for and relative 
production of products at the lower end of the productivity, technology and skill spectrum will 
decrease and grow for products at the other end. 
10  For an analysis of specialisation patterns leading to virtuous versus vicious circles involving 
exchange rate regimes, current account balances, and degrees of openness, see Pieper (1998). ______________________________________________________________ IWH 
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(1999) for a literature-review of integration theories). In general, however, such models 
remain largely theoretical and do not lend themselves to a convincing empirical analysis. 
Neither can therefore our analysis make use of a rigid theoretical framework. Rather, the 
empirical analysis inductively generates a model of productivity growth determined by 
specialisation-patterns and the respective productivity gaps. This model is then used to 
assess future prospects for productivity growth and catch up in the countries assessed. 
The structural composition of manufacturing industry determines productivity growth 
during integration through two interactive channels: first, structures change in the course 
of economic integration. This is an aggregate effect of product or branch-differentiated 
firm entry and exit adjustment processes triggered by intensifying competition. A new 
pattern of division of labour emerges between the integrating partners. With the number 
of firms of higher productivity levels increasing (possibly at the detriment of firms at the 
lower end of the productivity spectrum), the average aggregate productivity level will 
increase without one firm actually increasing productivity itself (and vice versa). This can 
be thought of as a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction.  
Second, average aggregate productivity growth from sources rooting in existing and 
efficiency-improving firms, like technology transfer and implementation, R&D, innovation 
and cost-rationalisation, also depends on structural patterns: the more firms in any given 
industry which belong to a class with typically high potentials for productivity growth, the 
larger is the base for productivity growth, the wider the potential. This can be thought of 
as a process of technological advancement, in the case of CEECs predominantly 
technological catch-up. 
In this respect, labour intensive production and production typically less demanding on 
labour skills will be less prone to implement foreign technology, will produce less 
innovations, etc. On the contrary, more capital intensive firms, firms that need a large 
fraction of high skilled workers due to the kind of product or production processes, and 
firms that belong to a technology-intensive class typically generate higher productivity 
growth.
11
 Finally, the extent, strategic aim and structural distribution of foreign direct 
investment into any country’s industry will also depend on the structural composition of 
this country’s industry: the availability of skilled employees is higher where a larger share 
of industrial workforce is engaged in more demanding jobs; the larger the base of supply 
industries, the larger will be the fraction of value added in the host country within the 
foreign direct investor’s production chain, etc. 
                                                 
11  In East Germany, the R&D-intensive sector exhibited a lesser speed in productivity catch-up to 
the West as compared to the less R&D intensive sector (BMBF, 2002, p. 57). This, however, can 
be considered an atypical result, possibly rooting in the large share of FDI in rather less R&D-
intensive firms. IWH ______________________________________________________________ 
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In the model constructed here, it is assumed that productivity growth in general roots 
from two distinct sources: first, productivity grows due to global technological change, 
i.e. what is termed in neo-classical growth theory the ‘natural rate’. This is approximated 
here by the average productivity growth of the EU-15 in the more recent past and 
amounts to 1.9 per cent per year (see table 2). The second source of productivity 
growth i s a feature of technological catch-up and is specialisation-determined in the 
sense outlined above. 
The speed of technological catch-up in general depends on the actual extent of 
backwardness: in the concept of “advantages of backwardness”, it is assumed that 
productivity growth will be faster in ‘backward’ countries than in countries at the 
contemporary technological frontier.
12
 Hence, the second (specialisation-determined) 
source of productivity growth through technological catch-up is weighted across the 








i PG , p p p * + =    (1.1) 
  ) ( , patterns tion specialisa f
t
i S = p   (1.2) 
with 
t
i p  denoting productivity growth of country  i in year  t;  EU p  the average 
productivity growth in the EU-15, 
t
i PG  the productivity gap of country i in year t vis-à-
vis the average EU-15 level, and 
t
i S, p  the part of productivity growth, empirically 
determined by specialisation-patterns in a model. 
This specialisation and backwardness-determined productivity growth can best be 
assessed empirically in the framework of a taxonomy that groups industries or branches 
into classes according to homogeneous common criteria. The list of criteria used in this 
analysis is derived from trade and growth theories and includes labour intensity, capital 
intensity, skill intensity of workers, and technology intensity. The individual classifications 
used here are borrowed from the rich new WIFO taxonomy which provides a whole 
variety of different classifications (Peneder 1999, 2000). This taxonomy was empirically 
generated from a selection of mature OECD market economies. It was generated with a 
view on the competitiveness of EU firms and countries, and has the potential to replace 
other taxonomies used so far, as e.g. OECD (1994). 
The use of branch-classifications for an analysis of transition economies has some 
advantages over a direct measuring of criteria at firm level first due to non-availability of 
firm-level data. Second, the construction of a taxonomy by use of mature market 
                                                 
12  Available technology can be implemented via imitation. Backward countries have the advantage 
of being able to improve their performance without having to invest into own innovations. See 
Gerschenkron (1962), or product cycle theories. ______________________________________________________________ IWH 
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economies allows a correction of possible distortions in manufacturing branches in 
transition economies in respect to the criteria: it is to be expected that some branches in 
transition economies in fact take ‘unusual’ values for the criteria assessed which could 
root in their socialist past. These values have to be treated as ‘unusual’ for a prognostic 
analysis, as they are most likely to adjust to ‘normal’ values in the process of intensified 
integration. After all, the ‘normal’ values of criteria within classes have been deducted 
from conditions amongst competitive firms in mature markets, and no doubt, transition 
economies will develop into countries with competitive firms due to their exposure in the 
common integration area of the EU - whatever the level of national GDP per capita. 
This way, this correction-function grants the taxonomy-method a higher level of 
prognostic quality. 
A linear regression of productivity growth against the respective sizes of classes of 
specialisation, and corrected by extent of backwardness, provides an empirical model of 
productivity growth in transition economies in the recent past
13
: 
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with 
t
i LI  denoting the share of labour intensive branches in the manufacturing industry of 
country i at the end of year t; 
t
i LI  the share of the class of labour intensive industrial 
branches,  ) (CI  denoting capital intensity,  ) ( SI h-  low-skill intensity,  ) (TI  technology 
intensity, and 
1 - t
i PG  the productivity gap of country i at the end of year t-1.
14
 
It goes without saying that, methodologically, this model will best apply to the transition 
economies in the panel. Due to the consideration of a backwardness-criterion, it could, 
however, be used for more mature economies as well: e.g. for the technological leader, 
the model would predict productivity growth to equal the ‘natural rate’, as the extent of 
backwardness is zero. The results of the regression are presented in table 3. 
In line with economic theory and with what plausibility would lead us to expect, the class 
of manufacturing branches composed of firms with typically high labour intensities is 
negatively associated with average industrial labour productivity growth. Capital 
                                                 
13  During transformational recession at the outset of systemic change, specialisation patterns 
were subject to profound changes and will not have reflected any market-criteria. For the model 
to produce sensible and robust results, the period of analysis was chosen to start in 1993 and to 
extend to 1999. Data for specialisation patterns were only available for the two years of 1995 and 
1998. The missing data was computed by extrapolation (trend line analysis). 
14  The one-period lag of productivity gaps in the model is a necessity, as gaps can only be 
computed after productivity growth had been calculated. IWH ______________________________________________________________ 
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intensive, high skill intensive and technology intensive branches are all positively 
associated with productivity growth.
15
  
Table 3  Results of regression models of classes of industrial branches and 
productivity growth in the pool of selected countries 
    coefficient    t-statistic    adjusted R
2 
Labour intensity      -0.12      -7.3    Weighted statistics: 
Capital intensity      0.14      2.6    0.97 
High-skill intensity      0.33      2.8    Unweighted statistics: 
Technology intensity      0.54      10.4    0.66 
Pooled least squares analysis (cross section weights) with 6 countries and 6 years (36 
observations). 
Due to the small number of observations, the R-square of the unweighted statistics only 
reaches 66 per cent. Still, this is considered sufficiently robust to warrant further analysis 
by use of this model: a test of the model’s representation of observed productivity 
growth by estimated growth showed only small deviations.
16
 
This enables the analysis to use the empirical model to estimate future potentials for 
productivity growth for each of the EU accession countries in the panel. For this, 
obviously, assumptions on the future development of structural patterns are necessary. 
Two scenarios are assessed: one assumes that the trends in the recent past will prevail in 
the short to medium term. This path-dependency scenario models a distinct pattern of 
specialisation emerging between the industries of CEECs and the EU in the course of 
intensifying integration. Here, logarithmic
17
 trends extending existing data to the year of 
2020 have been used, following the assumption that the most recent trend towards 
distinct patterns of specialisation (i.e. after the most severe de-industrialisation had been 
overcome) now reflect market conditions and country-specific conditions prevailing. 
Hence, trends are taken to indicate medium-term patterns of specialisation. In the 
second scenario, the opposite structural development is assumed, namely structural 
convergence: it is perceivable that in line with technological catching up, the industries of 
accession partners will engage in the kind of intra-industrial trade typical for the industries 
                                                 
15  Comparable qualitative results for the classifications derived from WIFO were also obtained 
when constructing the taxonomy by use of a variety of empirical methods (see Peneder 1999, 
2000). 
16  In fact, several other models with different groups of specialisation patterns have been 
estimated in an attempt to test the robustness of the regression model presented here. All 
models produced surprisingly similar results with respect to the quantification of catching up 
potentials. 
17  The advantage of logarithmic trends over linear trends in this case is that the intensity of 
structural changes can be expected to abate in the course of time: adjustment pressures will 
have been strongest at the outset of systemic transformation and liberalisation. ______________________________________________________________ IWH 
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of most member states.
18
 Here, the sizes of shares of the four classes converge to the 
sizes of classes prevailing in Germany
19
 today by the year 2010. 
3  Medium-term prospects for productivity growth and catch-up 
Amongst the most prominent comparative advantages, CEECs can make use o f 
significantly lower wages. Even after correcting for productivity differences, some 
advantage in lower labour costs remains.
20
 Because, additionally, capital stocks in 
CEEC’s industries tend to only gradually be upgraded technologically, we can expect 
that manufacturing production in CEECs to be comparatively less capital intensive and 
more labour intensive: firms producing tradable goods and succeeding on the enlarged 
European market will make use of lower labour costs by employing relatively more 




A further deduction of this resource-based view is that production in CEECs will also 
tend to be distinct  vis-à-vis the EU in terms of skill-intensity of employees: a 
technologically less advanced capital stock and relative abundance of labour in CEECs 
will make industrial production most competitive in branches which typically use less 
skilled workers. We expect CEEC’s manufacturing in general to employ less high-skilled 
workers to operate machinery and rather to work more manually. 
In fact, specialisation-patterns in CEECs as compared to Germany, match such 
expectations (table 4): the CEEC shares of branches belonging to the class of labour 
intensive manufacturing industries are much higher as compared to Germany, whereas 
the class of capital intensive branches is slightly underrepresented in most CEECs vis-à-
vis Germany. 
An exception is the Slovak Republic: here, low labour intensity in comparison to other 
CEECs is due mainly to much lower shares in manufacturing of wood, wood products 
and furniture, casting of metals and fabricated metal products, as well as lower shares of 
                                                 
18  For an assessment of structures in trade between the industries of EU accession and members 
states, refer to Gabrisch / Segnana (2001). The results do not suggest structural convergence. 
Rather, a distinct pattern of vertical intra-industrial trade emerging between East and West 
would indicate the emergence of distinct specialisation patterns across the criterion of product 
quality (interpretable in the framework of the product-cycle concept). 
19  Germany’s industry is a good representative of the EU in this comparison, as the country is one 
of the main trading partners for CEECs and its manufacturing structures are well balanced with 
the ones for the average of the 15 current member states. 
20  For a detailed empirical evaluation of CEEC’s labour cost advantages, see e.g. Havlik (1998). 
21  If a particular production does not lend itself to replace capital by labour (i.e. if production is 
limitational), then the producer will not be able to succeed on a market against competitors with 
better capital equipment and exit or not start at all in CEECs. IWH ______________________________________________________________ 
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manufacturing of wearing apparels. The higher shares of capital intensive industries can 
be traced back to larger industries refining petroleum products, the first processing 
treatment of iron and steel, the manufacturing of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
and of pulp and paper. 
Table 4  Patterns of specialisation in manufacturing industries of selected 
countries in CEECs and average EU-15, in 1999 
    Labour 
intensity 
  Capital 
intensity 
  High-skill 
intensity 
  Technology 
intensity 
Estonia      42.4      5.7      7.4      5.8 
Poland      30.7      9.5      10.5      7.1 
Czech Republic      28.5      10.7      12.0      10.0 
Slovak Republic      19.1      24.5      10.2      12.2 
Hungary      25.5      11.2      9.8      12.1 
Slovenia      22.3      9.1      12.3      16.0 
Germany      19.6      10.4      16.9      20.7 
Note:    Values are given in shares of classes of branches of manufacturing industry. Estonia, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Germany’s shares are measured as 
employment shares, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia’s as value added shares 
(involving the comparative limitations described in footnote 2). 
Sources:  EUROSTAT, WIIW, National Statistical Offices, own calculations. 
Furthermore, CEECs exhibit lower shares in high-skilled industries. In parallel, branches 
with a high technology intensity are underrepresented as compared to Germany. In 
general, Slovenia’s and the Slovak Republic’s structures of manufacturing industry are 
closest to the ones of Germany, and Estonia and Poland are furthest away. Do these 
results re-appear in the estimates of prospects for future productivity growth in our 
empirical model? 
Extending, as described above, the trends of specialisation of manufacturing industries 
into the medium-term future in the two scenarios, the empirical model allows an 
estimation of future productivity growth for each country in the panel. The calculated 
rates of growth of industrial labour productivity and estimated productivity gaps are 
presented in table 5 for the years of 2004 and 2010 and for the two scenarios A and B, 
with scenario A being the specialisation-scenario and B the convergence-scenario (see 
also annexes 2.1 and 2.2 for a graphical representation of results). The year of 2004 
represents the envisaged date of accession of (the first group of) CEECs. Then, the 
newly acceded countries will start to benefit from EU structural and cohesion fund 
policy. The first planning period for these policies will end 2010. 
For most countries in our panel, the two scenarios produce significantly different results: 
catching up potentials are predicted much higher in the structural convergence-scenario, ______________________________________________________________ IWH 
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as compared to the specialisation scenario. Here, the structures serve as retarding 
factors: labour intensity remains higher, capital intensity, skill and technology intensity 
lower. In scenario A, structures swiftly change to mirror the patterns in our benchmark 
country, hence predicted results are better. In particular: labour intensive branches (being 
associated with lower productivity growth potentials) adjust downwards or at a faster 
pace than in scenario A (compare annexes 1.1 and 2.1).
22
 Additionally, in scenario B, 
technology intensities are on the rise or at a faster pace. Scenario B does not, however, 
produce greater productivity growth potentials with respect to capital intensity in the 
cases of the Slovak Republic and Hungary. 
Structural composition and estimated trends in the Slovak Republic appear to be best 
suited for a speedy process of productivity catch-up in both scenarios. Assuming a per 
anno productivity growth in the EU of some 1.9 per cent (compare table 2) to account 
for the fact that catching up is a process towards a moving target, the Slovak Republic 
with the initially highest growth rates is predicted to reach a productivity level of nearly 
60  per cent of the EU-average by 2004, and 75  per cent, the GDP per capita 
threshold for EU structural and cohesion funds policy
23
, around 2010. The country with 
the highest starting level, Slovenia, is predicted to reach 75 per cent of the average 
industrial EU productivity level already around 2005. 
Slovenia’s predicted performance in scenario A is not significantly different from that in 
scenario B: this is due to the fact that the predicted structural development in scenario A 
comes close to structural convergence. The biggest differences between the results for 
either scenarios emerge for Poland and in particular for Estonia. Here, the specialisation-
scenario predicts near stagnation. This despite the fact that the “advantages of 
backwardness” are highest for this country. 
Estonia in general received the weakest results: starting from a very low level, and with 
specialisation-patterns in scenario A predicting the lowest and even falling growth rates, 
its productivity level will reach only some 33 per cent of the average EU-15 by 2010. In 
the convergence-scenario, productivity growth is estimated to reach much higher levels 
with a growing trend, and even surpassing all other accession countries. Yet the level 
achieved here by 2010 still only reaches 55 per cent of the average EU-15 level. Unless 
structures change more rapidly than anticipated by either scenarios (e.g. by way of 
increased FDI-activity), Estonia will not be able to catch up to the EU in any foreseeable 
time span. This bleak result might be partly accountable to the fact that Estonia started 
some years later with systemic transformations and with re-orientation towards the West. 
With structural adjustment processes through integration still being under way,  
 
                                                 
22  In the Slovak Republic, labour intensity adjusts upwards at a slower pace in scenario B. 
23  It goes without saying that if labour productivity gaps remain below 75 per cent, industrial GDP 
per capita levels will not be able to be much higher, that is, unless unemployment rates reach 
very low levels and participation rates very high levels. In the case of Slovenia, the 
unemployment rate of 1999 was 13.5 per cent according to harmonised ILO - statistics. IWH ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5  Estimated productivity growth (in average per anno growth rates) and estimated productivity levels (in EU-15 = 100) of selected 
CEECs 
    Scenario A: Specialisation    Scenario B: Convergence 
    2004    2010    2004    2010 
    Growth    Level    Growth    Level    Growth    Level    Growth    Level 
    2004/1999    EU=100    2010/2004    EU=100    2004/1999    EU=100    2010/2004    EU=100 
Estonia    3.0    30.3    2.6    31.1    7.3    36.0    11.8    54.6 
Poland    5.3    46.8    4.9    53.7    7.8    51.5    9.1    70.7 
Czech Republic    6.5    53.3    5.6    63.4    8.5    57.2    8.3    76.0 
Slovak Republic    9.0    57.5    7.0    72.4    10.0    59.5    8.1    78.5 
Hungary    7.2    58.0    6.3    70.9    8.3    60.3    7.7    78.4 
Slovenia    7.4    70.1    5.6    83.2    7.8    71.2    6.0    86.2 
EU-15    1.9    100    1.9    100    1.9    100    1.9    100 
Note:    Scenario A assumes distinct patterns of specialisation emerging from intensified integration. Scenario B assumes structural convergence to the benchmark of 
Germany; convergence is achieved by the year 2010. 
Source:  own calculations. __________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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the empirical model in particular in scenario A might be biased. In any case, productivity 
growth rates well in excess of 15 per cent would be needed to bring the country closer to the 
results of the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
In terms of catching up performance in both scenarios, Hungary and the Slovak Republic are 
estimated to fare nearly equally, despite the Slovak Republic starting from a lower base: in the 
convergence scenario, both countries could reach 75 of the EU-average by the year 2009, in 
scenario A some 2-3 years later. The specialisation trends predicted in scenario A for the 
Czech Republic are associated with a much slower pace of catching up as compared to the 
convergence scenario. 
Poland’s predictions are even less bright, albeit better than for Estonia in both scenarios: with 
growth rates comparable to the Czech Republic in scenario A and Hungary in scenario B, and 
a much lower starting level, Poland can expect to reach a level of some 50 per cent of the 
EU-average by 2006 in scenario A and by 2004 in scenario B. 
Conclusions 
This analysis attempted to estimate future productivity growth potentials and prospects of 
productivity catch-up in the manufacturing industries of EU accession states. An empirical 
model was estimated, using structural patterns and the extent of backwardness (in terms of the 
size of the productivity gap vis-à-vis the EU-15 average) as determinants of productivity 
growth. The results are presented for two scenarios with distinct assumptions concerning 
structural adjustment in the process of deepening integration and intensifying competition. 
In such a methodological framework, the empirical model established significant differences in 
productivity growth prospects amongst the group of most advanced EU accession candidates: 
the prospects are clearly best for the Slovak Republic, and in particular even better than in 
Slovenia. Starting from a lower level as compared to Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Poland, the Slovak Republic  is predicted to surpass those countries in their catching up 
processes. This is especially pronounced in the first of the two scenarios, assuming the 
emergence of a distinct pattern of specialisation between EU accession and member states. 
The worst productivity potentials and prospects are predicted for Estonia. Estonia not only 
starts from the lowest level of labour productivity in 1999, but its structural composition of 
manufacturing industries and the associated trends also grant the country the lowest estimated 
productivity growth rates. Poland also performs poorly in both scenarios of the estimated 
model. The Czech Republic is predicted to perform better, however clearly worse than 
Hungary. 
If patterns of industrial structures in manufacturing determine potentials for industrial labour 
productivity growth and if structural patterns up until 1998 determine a trend of specialisation 
within the common integration area which can be extended into the future, i.e. if patterns, or IWH ___________________________________________________________________ 
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more precise: trends, exhibit hysteresis, then the empirical model predicts that productivity 
catch-up in accession states will take much longer than two decades. A productivity level of 
some 75 per cent of the EU-average is achieved in the case of Slovenia well before 2010, in 
the Slovak Republic, and Hungary slightly after 2010, and in the Czech Republic around 
2018. The conditions prevailing in Estonia and Poland suggest that even a level of 75 per cent 
will not be reached in this kind of time-frame. 
With more data being made available and with the generation of more experience in the real 
economy adjustment processes of economic transition emerging, the empirical model 
suggested in this paper will gain in terms of predicting power. Already now, the model is 
surprisingly robust for most of the countries assessed, lending support to the qualitative results 
generated. 
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Annex 1.2: 
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Annex 2.2: 
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